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Abstract 
 
 
This study sets to investigate the reasons behind state action in an enlarged Europe. It 
does so through its regional policy and the structural funds for the budget period 
2007-2013 by the example of Poland. The question posed is: why is there a 
centralization trend on a national level in Poland when EU decentralizes its regional 
policy? The analysis suggests that the answer can be found by adopting a state-
centered realist approach complemented with a constructivist perspective. The Polish 
state is an autonomous actor in need of resources in order to maintain political power. 
Resources could either be obtained from its own country by, for example, taxes or 
from outside means by, for example, EU funding. Therefore, when the EU gives the 
member state more control over the structural funds it results in a centralization 
process on a national level. This behavior is accentuated by the Polish inherent value 
system that favors centralization as explained by a constructivist approach. 
 
Keywords: EU, Regional Policy, State Action, Structural Fund, Poland, 
Centralization. 
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1 Introduction 
 
European Union’s (EU) regional policy and regionalization in an enlarged Europe 
have been the subject of considerable debate. Many scholars have focused on the 
effectiveness of EU’s policies. Some scholars uphold that EU policies have facilitated 
decentralization of authority into the regions (Hooghe 1998 p. 460-462; Hooge, 
Marks 1995 p. 283; Sutcliffe 2000 p. 291, Gemitis 2003 p. 8). Others argue that the 
EU impact on regionalization has been limited (Brusis 2002, 2005; Grabbe 2001; 
Marek, Braun 2002). While the debate about EU regional policies has focused on the 
effectiveness of policies this paper raises the question of the reasoning behind state 
action in a NMS (New Member State). 
The inspiration for this study is the challenges and the new choices faced by the 
new member states in an enlarged EU. Through transition, the NMSs had to change 
their national systems, values, and give up some of their sovereignty to a higher 
authority in order to receive the benefits that an EU membership entitles. Hence, this 
analysis deals with the choices a state makes in regional policy when EU changes its 
rules, allowing for more independence. This is done through investigating the 
structural funds in Poland for the budget period 2007-2013. 
Part of EU philosophy is that decision making should be made on the lowest 
possible level1. This is why, for example, the Commission decided to reform itself and 
produced the White Paper of March 2000 (Commission 2000, 2000a). In this paper 
one of the points is the principle of decentralization of decision-making with explicit 
responsibilities. However, in an enlarged Europe, a decentralization decision on an 
EU level is not necessarily perpetuated in the application of the policy in the member 
state. In fact, by using Poland as a case study, we find a surprising result. Following a 
decentralization of the structural funds to give more power to the member states the 
outcome was centralization within the nation. The study shows that the Polish 
government actively changed the system in order to gain more control over the funds 
at the expense of regional actors.  
I find this trend of ‘opposite effect’ of EU policy-making in theory and in 
practice an interesting phenomenon worth exploring. If EU policies resulting 
distancing instead of furthering the integration process, the purpose of these policies 
is defeated. Therefore, in this study I approach this controversy from the theoretical 
framework of the logic behind state action. Hopefully this essay can be a contribution 
to the broader debate about the problems that the NMSs are facing. 
 
1.1 The Research Question, the Aim and the Outline 
 
The effectiveness of EU Regional Policy has been extensively debated. There is also a 
vast amount of literature on centralization, decentralization processes and state action. 
However, not much is written about the reasons for ‘opposite effect’ outcomes in the 
NMSs of EU Regional policies.  
This study, therefore, asks why decentralization processes in the structural funds 
on an EU level result in centralization activities within Poland? The inspiration for 
                                                 
1
 The principle of subsidiarity. 
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this subject is the question of; what happens when EU changes its regional policy in 
an enlarged Europe? 
The aim is to set up a theoretical framework for state action which has a twofold 
purpose. Firstly, it aspires to contribute to an understanding of the NMS’s trend of 
centralization in the decentralizing system of the EU. Secondly, it is to be applied to 
the Polish case.  
This essay will be divided into three parts. The first part is a theoretical 
framework, laying out the fundamental principles behind state action in an enlarged 
Europe from the point of the national state’s view. This section consists of two 
sections: one that uses the logic of a state-centered realist approach and one that 
complements this approach with a constructivist perspective. The second section is 
empirical and starts with a discussion on decentralization patterns on an EU level and 
changes in the structural funds followed by a description of centralization trend in 
Poland in the funds. The third section is the application of the theoretical framework 
in the first part to the empirical material in part two. 
 
1.2 The Theoretical Argument 
 
This study examines the rationale behind state action in an enlarged Europe. EU152 
and EU273 are very different in terms of economics, level of integration, history and 
social political culture. On one hand, the EU15 is guided by one set of principles and 
theories developed over many years of cooperation in a system built to accommodate 
these countries. On the other hand, the new Eastern accessions are facing the pressure 
to reach a level of the ‘old member states’ at the same time as they have to try to find 
their own place within the already ‘pre-packaged‘ EU system. Therefore, it is 
interesting to look toward the east to examine state action and the theoretical 
argument of this study will be based on the view from the national level.  
From a member state perspective this work adopts realist framework for 
understanding the processes within the state, specifically a state centric approach. 
This concept in itself does, however, not paint the complete picture. It will, therefore, 
be complemented with a social constructivist perspective. There are different views 
about the usefulness of combining a constructivist and a realist perspective and not 
everyone will agree that these two theories are supplementary. However, I find these 
theories complementary rather than contradictory in this case study. Although the 
realist and constructivist approaches are based on contrasting reality assumptions, 
they feature different aspects of state action. Therefore, despite that these two theories 
might not be entire compatible, there is a point to analyze state action from both 
perspectives. Together, these two models give us the structure needed in order to 
understand the processes behind national activity in an enlarged Europe. 
 
1.2.1 State Centrism  
 
A state being a member in the EU requires the juggling of issues interacting 
simultaneous in the domestic and international spheres in a complex system with 
often conflicting opinions. Hence, there is a relationship between domestic and 
                                                 
2
 The ’old member states’. 
3
 EU15+EU12 the NMSs or the 2004 and 2007 accessions. 
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international systems that needs to be investigated in order to understand the actions 
of a state in the EU. The classical realist theory discusses how domestic politics can 
achieve international goals, but leaves out an explanation for how international 
policies can be used in order to achieve domestic aims. The structural realist theory 
takes the nation-state for granted and theorizes about the consequences of its actions 
in the international system, but does not elaborate on domestic politics. Hence, an 
approach that takes into account both sides of politics is needed. This paper, therefore, 
adopts a state-centric approach. This perspective considers both domestic and 
international politics and understands the process as interactive between the two. In 
this view, the state as an organization wants to survive but needs resources. 
Subsequently, the state can be seen as a tax collector. It does not matter if it gets these 
resources from taxing its own people or from the EU in form of funding. Therefore, 
when the EU changes its regional policy, the member state is bound to use the new 
situation to its advantage by centralizing as many resources as possible to the state 
level. State-centric realists used in this study are Gilpin and Mastanduno, Lake and 
Ikenberry. 
In developing the argument I will use Mastaduno, Lake and Ikenberry’s ‘two 
faces of state action’ (the domestic and international strategies chosen by states). 
States could either choose domestic strategies in order to achieve international goals 
(internal mobilization or extraction) or international strategies in attaining domestic 
goals (external extraction or validation). The selection of strategies depends on how 
strong the state is in the domestic and international spheres. 
 
1.2.2 Social Constructivism 
 
While the realist framework explains the state’s actions on an economic and political 
level, it overlooks the importance of historical and cultural processes of state identity 
and value formation. Socially constructed rules, identities, ideas and values are 
principal to the understanding of the centralization process in the NMSs. The Polish 
state identity is the construct of a historical perpetuation of centralization, accepted by 
both state officials and society. Although the EU has introduced new values of 
liberalization, democratization and regionalization, the member state will act in line 
with its fundamental socially constructed rules, ideas and values. Hence, Poland, with 
a strong identity of centralization, will aggregate policies if there is decentralization 
on an EU level. I have looked at the works of for example: Törnquist-Plewa, Batt, 
Risse, Marcussen, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf, Roscher, Wendt, Adler, Haas, 
Christiansen, Jörgensen, Wiener and Checkel. 
In my analysis I will discuss the historical construction of Poland, differences in 
state creation in Poland and the EU and Alexander Wendt’s ‘three cultures of 
anarchy’ and place Poland and the EU within the grid of cooperation and degrees of 
internalization. I will do this to show the different philosophies of EU15 and the 
NMSs and to emphasize the possible changeable nature of the state.  
 
1.2.3 The Case of Poland 
 
“In Poland, ethnic and regional identities did re-emerge as a significant issue in the 
regionalization debates, but Poland’s size, national self-confidence, and enthusiastic 
embrace of the ‘European’ ideal have meant that these potential centrifugal ‘threats’ did 
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not prevent wide-ranging political decentralization of the state, which began even before 
pressure for regionalization was felt from the side of the EU.” (Batt 2002 p. 12) 
 
Granted not all new Eastern and Central European accession countries are alike. I 
have chosen Poland as a case study for several reasons. First, Poland is considered 
one of the most ‘integrated’ states of the new accessions and has in many ways 
successfully assimilated to the EU15 system. It is also one of the more stable systems 
in Eastern Europe. (Batt 2002; EBRD 2003; Marek, Baun, 2002) In order to look at 
the effects of regional policy, it is important to use a relatively stable and acclimated 
case to analyze. Secondly, Poland is not an insignificant actor in the EU system. It is 
large both population and area wise. It has also proven itself an important player in 
EU negotiations and does often demonstrate its opinions and ideas. Third, Poland is 
an interesting case because it is getting an enormous amount of structural support for 
the budget period 2007-2013, more than any other country has ever received 
throughout EU history. Fourth, the theory used can appropriately be applied to Polish 
case. The empirical material shows that the Polish state is an actor in itself, which has 
altered the system in order to gain more economic and political control over the 
structural funds. Therefore, a state centric approach can account for this phenomenon. 
In addition to this, Poland has an inherent culture of centralization that can be 
explained by social constructivism.  
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
 
This analysis suggests that: when the EU leaves more responsibilities to the NMS, the 
national government responds by activities in collecting more power to the state 
instead of following the EU’s intentional delegation of power to regional actors. The 
reason behind this behavior can be explained by a state centric realist approach 
complemented with a social constructivist view. The realist argument considers the 
Polish state is an actor in itself and is in need of funds in order to survive. Therefore, 
it will try to gain more power over the funds when the opportunity is presented. This 
behavior is accentuated by the Polish inherent value system that favors centralization 
as explained by a constructivist approach.  
 
1.4 Method and Material 
 
In this essay I am going to apply theory using the case study method. I have a puzzle 
that is interesting to me and I aspire to explain and explore this subject and apply the 
theory to the case of Poland.  
The theoretical framework of this study is based on the relevant literature for 
each of the two approaches used. Worth mentioning here are the inspirations for the 
intellectual structure. The realist theoretical material and the state centric approach 
build mainly from an article by Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry from 1989. I will in 
my analysis of Poland use the choices that states have in retrieving resources from 
either the domestic or international sphere. I will do this in order to attempt to explain 
the Polish state’s activity of centralization of the structural funds.  
The social constructivist view is motivated by an interview with Professor 
Törnquist-Plewa at Lund University and much of the theoretical argument is based on 
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the works of Alexander Wendt. I will use this theory in order to show how the Polish 
state is formed throughout history into a centralizing tradition and what effect this has 
on its behavior. I will also show how the EU and Poland have different perceived 
realities of the world and the possibility to change these.  
The empirical material derives from interviews as well as written official 
documentations. In terms of interviews, I carried out one interview with a senior 
specialist in the central agency for the structural funds in Warsaw. The interview was 
one hour and fifteen minutes long, conducted in an office in the Ministry of Regional 
Development (MRR). It was semi-structured and I tape-recorded the conversation as 
well as taking personal notes. The next interview in Poland was with Ms Agnieszka 
Surudo and Ms Aleksandra Budny at the Pomorskie voivodship in Gdansk (the 
Marshal’s Office), the managing authority for the Regional Operational Programme. 
This interview was 40 minutes long and held in a conference room in the Pomorskie 
Marshal’s office. It was semi-structured and I took notes while I tape-recorded the 
conversation. I made one interview with Ms Barbara Törnquist-Plewa at the Center 
for Eastern and Central European Studies at Lund University. The interview was semi 
structured, one hour long and I took notes. I have one interview with Mr. Gunnar 
Haglund, Counselor of Business Promotion at the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw. The 
interview was an extensive email conversation. I also attended a seminar about 
structural funding in Poland at the Swedish-Polish Chamber of Commerce in 
Stockholm.  
The written empirical documentation originates from the European Commission, 
Parliament, Council, the EBRD, MRR and other material produced by government 
actors. They consist of case law, statistically produced documents, national strategies, 
official guides, communications, analyses, studies, and debate questions. 
 
Part I – Theoretical Framework 
 
The European cooperation is a unique and complex formation with multiple layers of 
governance and competences spread out between the Community and the member 
states. The relationship between the 27 states is based on the acquis communautaire, 
the supremacy of EU law and direct effect. Collaboration is achieved through formal 
negotiations, but also through informal network alliances and under the understanding 
that negotiations are continuous in nature. Hence, EU membership requires the 
interaction of issues both in the domestic and international spheres. This relationship 
is complex and is often defined by conflicting ideas and interests between the state 
and the Union. Consequently, the theoretical framework needs to take into account the 
relationship between domestic and international systems in order to understand the 
actions of a state in the EU.  
This section will lay down a theoretical foundation for state action in an enlarged 
Europe in order to try to understand why decentralization processes on the EU level 
result in centralization processes on a national level. It starts with a definition of the 
state and a discussion on the logic of state action and the fact that the old and the new 
member states in the EU follow different ‘logics’. The following two sections 
establish the principles of state action in Eastern Europe by adopting a state centric 
realist perspective complemented by a social constructivist approach. 
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2 The Logic of State Action 
 
In a study of state action it is important to define the understanding of what the state 
is. I will use Mastaduno, Lake and Ikenberry’s definition of the state. A nation-state is 
a territorial unit and the state is defined as politicians and administrators in the 
executive branch of the government. This definition would equal state with the regime 
under the presumption that the preferences of state officials are “partially, if not 
wholly, distinct from the parochial concerns of either societal groups or particular 
government institutions, and are tied to the conceptions of the national interest or the 
maximization of some social welfare function.” (Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry 1989 
p. 459) 
Realities vary depending on experience. The rationale behind state action in the 
EU can be divided into two viewpoints. On one hand, the ‘old member states’ follow 
one set of logic, developed over time, characterized by a long tradition of cooperation. 
These states have had the time to learn the EU system and the possibility to influence 
the direction that it has taken. On the other hand, the ‘new member states’ follow a 
different set of assumptions based on their previous socio-economic histories and 
their ‘newness’ to the system of the Union. These countries are trying to catch up both 
in terms of local development and political capability within the EU apparatus. 
Furthermore, they  have had to accept a pre-made ‘package deal’ of economic realities 
and value systems in order to join the EU without the possibility to influence these to 
make them more suitable to their internal situations.  
This study looks at the forces behind state action in the recently joined NMSs 
through the example of Poland. The question asks why there is a centralization trend 
in Poland, despite the EU attempts to decentralize the system of the distribution of EU 
funds? I have approached this question from the perspective of the state. This paper, 
therefore, adopts a realist state-centric perspective. This approach takes into account 
both domestic and international politics and understands the process as interactive 
between the both. In this view, the state is seen as an actor in the business of self 
preservation and resource collection. Means could be in form of domestic taxation or 
outside resources, ex EU-funding. Therefore, when the EU changes its regional 
policy, the member state is bound to use the new situation in order to try to gather 
assets. 
Although a state centered approach does not reject the importance of ideals and 
values it is lacking a ‘deeper’ understanding of state formation throughout history in 
Eastern Europe. States in this area have often had a difficult road to autonomy with 
constantly changing and insecure territorial borders. National identity has been 
painfully constructed and sovereignty recurrently had to be fought for. (Batt 2002 p. 
2) Therefore, a constructivist approach complements the realist perspective taking 
into account the historical construction of state identity formation. (Risse 2004 p. 161) 
 
2.1 Realism and State Action in EU 
 
“The realities of interdependence dictate that the ability of governments to pursue 
domestic policies effectively is influenced and constrained by developments in the 
international system. It is equally evident that the realization of international objectives 
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depends meaningfully on domestic politics and economics.” (Mastanduno, Lake,  
Ikenberry 1989 p. 457) 
 
There are three central arguments that all realist traditions have in common. First, the 
international environment is anarchic in nature and governed by sovereign states. 
Second, the relationship between these states is competitive, not excluding 
cooperation if it is in the state’s interest. Third, states are behaving in their self 
interests toward other states in order to increase their own power and economics. 
(Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry 1989 p. 459; Gilpin 2001 p. 16; Andreatta 2005 p. 23) 
However, besides for these commonalities, there are many strands in the realist 
tradition with different contexts in how they explain international affairs.  
Classical realists4 and structural realists5 explain some aspects of international 
relations but don’t give us the whole picture. Classical realism looks from a state’s 
perspective out in the world. It is mainly concerned with how national sources are 
used in international relations and acknowledges how domestic politics influence 
these relations. Human nature is inherently self-centered and competitive, and states 
will aggressively compete internationally. (Mortgenthau 2003 p. 7-10) However, this 
tradition does not consider how international relations and sources could be used in 
order to achieve domestic goals. Structural realism (neorealism) is looking at the 
world from the perspective of the international system and in to the state. It develops a 
formal theory, which says that the international structure poses a constraint on state 
behavior with the result that states behave in a similar rational manner. (Waltz 2003 p. 
484) However, it does not consider the influence of domestic politics on international 
relations, taking the domestic situation and the nature of the state for granted. Both 
theories have something interesting to say about domestic or international systems but 
neither investigate the relationship between the two. (Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry 
1989 p. 460-461; Gilpin 1984 p. 298-299)  
The EU system produces an environment in which domestic and international 
relations are closely interactive and a theory explaining state action in this system 
needs to account for both. I will, therefore, argue for a state centered approach, which 
takes both these aspects into consideration. 
 
2.2 A State Centered Approach 
 
A state centered realist perspective considers the international system as an interaction 
between domestic and international politics. Regionalization, and membership in the 
EU, are explained by states making a conscious decision to share political and 
economic problems in an increasingly globalized and integrated world. Hence, in 
order to get a favorable share of international gains, to preserve national autonomy 
and to increase bargaining positions in disputes about distributive issues. (Gilpin 2001 
p. 21)  
 
2.2.1 Basic Assumptions 
 
In the state centric realist perspective, global order is seen as anarchic and competitive 
and there is no higher authority that the state can appeal for help in times of need. 
                                                 
4
 Ex. E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebur. 
5
 Ex. Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. 
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Therefore, it is possible to focuses on the individual state as the main actor 
international affairs. The state in itself has needs and interests and the outcome of 
domestic and international policies are the reflections of state interests. The main 
objective of the state is to survive, and in order to do this, it needs resources for 
political control. It can get these resources from either domestic means, such a 
taxation, or from outside the state, such as international funding. The fact that states 
are the principal actors does, however, not exclude cooperation, and states will create 
institutions in many areas. The EU is, thus, an important actor, just not the most 
principal one. National governments still make the primary decisions in economic 
matters, especially large states. Another important issue is that states are concerned 
with matters such as the terms of trade and the distribution of economic returns in the 
international environment. Therefore, not only absolute, but also relative gains among 
national economies are important to states. (Gilpin 2001 p. 16-19, 78) 
From above assumptions, it is evident that the domestic and international spheres 
are closely related. The next two sections will, therefore, consider the ‘two faces of 
state action’, i.e. domestic and international strategies by states, developed by 
Mastaduno, Lake and Ikenberry. States choose different strategies depending on if 
they are ‘soft’, decentralized and constrained, or ‘hard’, centralized and autonomous. 
These strategies are important for the comprehension of theory application in part 
three. 
 
2.2.2 Domestic Strategies for the Pursuit of International Goals 
 
Resources, such as power and wealth, are imperative for states and the pursuit of 
international goals. They are currencies used in order to purchase security and other 
political commodities. The ultimate aim of the state is to be self-preserving. Domestic 
strategies to gain power and wealth take two forms: the mobilization and the 
extraction of domestic resources.  
The first strategy for states is the internal mobilization of domestic resources. 
This is done to increase the wealth in society as a whole. The growth of the state is a 
direct investment in international power by the expansion of political and economic 
bases of power. This can be done either directly or indirectly. Direct expansion of the 
state can be achieved by the control and the distribution of production through 
planning or nationalization. Indirect economic goals can be reached by the promotion 
of the private sector by tools such as property rights, innovation encouragement etc. 
The other strategy is the internal extraction of domestic assets from society. Wealth is 
the basis for international power. However, this has to be converted into power by 
taxation and other state transfers. Hence, a state taxes the community in order to 
exercise international power. (Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry 1989 p. 462-463) 
 
2.2.3 International Strategies for the Pursuit of Domestic Goals 
 
Another important aspect of state survival is the support from society and the ability 
to overcome domestic challenges. This is true both for the state in itself and for 
officials holding important positions in the system. Therefore, in order to maintain 
their power and overcome position, state officials pursue domestic and international 
strategies.  
Domestic goals are two-fold; the acquisition of resource control to fence off 
challenges and reward supporters and the preservation of legitimacy. More legitimacy 
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equals less reliance on compensatory or coercive strategies. In order to achieve 
domestic goals, state officials can use international strategies. It could be in form of 
external extraction, which is the state effort to gather resources from outside its 
territory. These goods are used to decrease internal extraction and mobilization 
problems and to reach domestic goals. Assets could be collected from either direct 
external transfer to the state itself, ex EU funding, or from indirect external transfers 
to the community that the state can extract from at a later time. The second strategy is 
external validation, which is the use of authorative status in international negotiations 
in order to increase domestic political leverage. (Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry 1989 
p. 463-465) 
 
2.3 Social Constructivism 
 
Although constructivism and realism have different reality assumptions, I find it 
useful to complement a state centric realist perspective with a constructivist approach. 
In studying state action in an enlarged Europe through the case of Poland, I predicate 
that the realist argument of the basic state of nature holds up and a realist point of 
view explains current behavior of the state. However, there is an element of historical 
construction of ideas, norms and values of the state that is not adequately addressed in 
realism. In looking at the Eastern European countries, materialistic explanations are 
not sufficient in understanding the underlying attitude of states over time. Identity 
formation is very important and, therefore, this study complements the realist 
perspective with a constructivist point of view. 
 Social constructivism focuses on how individuals, or in this case states, 
participate in the creation of their perceived reality. It looks at the processes of how 
social realities are built, institutionalized and turned into accepted belief by society. 
Human structures are determined by shared ideas and collective identities, which over 
time turn into a common purpose. Hence, knowledge is the product of negotiations, 
and institutions are the representations of these realities. Constructivism looks at the 
importance of concepts such as ideas, values, norms, identities, practices and culture. 
(Checkel 1995 p. 351; Risse 2004 p. 160-162, Christiansen, Jörgensen, Wiener 2001 
p. 2-3;  Wendt 2003 p. 73) 
 This section will first discuss two fundamental commonalities in constructivist 
though of state construction. These dimensions are also discussed in relation to 
European cooperation. Thereafter, Wendt’s the three cultures of anarchy are presented 
to show normative differences between the EU and NMSs and the transformative 
nature of states. 
 
2.3.1 Constructivism and State Construction  
 
“interests are constructed in historically specific circumstances, that is, a context of 
social and cultural norms shape actor identity and behaviour.” (Fierke & Wiener 2001 p. 
125) 
 
Historical construction is, consequently, important to the state’s perception of itself. 
Social practices and activities throughout history produce the identity, norms and 
practices of the state. There are several different strands of constructivism. Scholars 
differ in their view of the level of how ‘socially constructed’ the world is. In a 
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labyrinth of ideas I find it possible to distinguish two conditions that constructivist 
scholars seem to hold explicitly or implicitly in common in terms of state action.  
First, the character of the state is a construct of the collective identities developed 
in society through the process of socialization, especially the elite, in a country. Key 
to this concept is the idea of identity, or how a society defines itself. For example, 
whether society beliefs it is democratic or authoritarian in nature affects its behavior. 
Politics is, hence, guided by the shared ideas, norms and values by actors in the 
system. (Marcussen, Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf, Roscher 2001 p. 102; Wendt 
1999 p. 372) Secondly, the social construction of the state is a two-way process and, 
as Wendt puts it, “the intersubjectivity constituted structure of identities and interests 
in the system” (2003 p. 76). As state identity becomes a more stable structure of 
interests and identities, it in itself becomes a motivating force of the created rules, 
norms and values toward its community. These factors then play an important role in 
shaping how the people in the country perceive themselves and what role they think 
they should have. (Wendt 2003 p. 74-75) 
Following the argument of the construction of the state, cooperation in Europe is 
also a constructive force. From a state perspective, it is socially constructed as a result 
of an ongoing process of state interactions, shaping its interests and identities. Politics 
is guided by the shared ideas, norms and values by actors in the system. Threats, fears 
and cultures in the international arena are the social constructs of the actors. 
(Marcussen, Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf, Roscher 2001 p. 118; Risse 2004 p. 
162; Adler, Haas 1992 p. 371) Furthermore, social relations on the European level 
affect the perception of interests on a national level. EU norms can in this way 
influence state action and play an important role in shaping member identities. 
(Checkel 1995 p. 352; Risse 2004 p. 162-164; Adler, Haas 1992 p. 372)  
 
2.3.2 The Three Cultures of Anarchy 
 
A third component, less discussed in academia, is the possibility to change state 
reality through the initiation of new social practices. (Marcussen, Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf, Roscher 2001 p. 114) These could be such as liberal values prescribed 
to the NMSs. Since the actors in the international system are the social construction of 
each other and of the system itself, patterns could be broken and destinies could be 
changed. This is an important aspect of state action because it says something about 
the future of the Eastern European states.  
 For my study, the ideas of Alexander Wendt are useful. His view on international 
relations is somewhat less strict compared to many ‘hard core’ constructivists in terms 
of the level of socialization as world-explanation. Wendt shared some of the key 
realist assumptions such as the fact that anarchy exist, that states are autonomous 
actors important in the international system and that states have basic self-interests 
prior to interaction with other states. However, he challenges the belief that 
materialistic reasons are the only determinants of the system. (Wendt 2003 p. 76-77) 
Wendt describes in his work A Social Theory of International Relations in 1999 
three cultures of anarchy motivating state action, i.e. three types of states: The 
Hobbesian (Pre-Modern), the Lockean (Modern) and the Kantian (Post-Modern). 
Each one of these states play different roles in international politics and have 
divergent norms and values. The Hobbesian culture of enemies, distinguished by “war 
by all against all” (p. 265), characterized international affairs until the seventeenth 
century. The Lockean culture of rivals, in which states see each others as rivals but 
don’t always use violence, dominated international relations in the modern state since 
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the Treaty of Westphalia. In my study, I make the assumption that the Eastern 
member states, and Poland, are in a Lockean and possibly in transit toward a Kantian 
culture. The Kantian culture of friends, in which states don’t perceive each other as 
threats and in which tools of persuasion is used rather than violence in disputes, is a 
recent phenomenon in relationships between democracies. EU is an example of this 
kind of culture. The values and norms of these three cultures can then be internalized 
in three degrees. The first degree is close to neorealism, the internalization of the 
norms is only a product of coercion and material forces. The second is consistent with 
neoliberalism, in which states comply to the norms for economic gain. The third 
degree is more aligned with constructivist views and states have internalized norms as 
legitimate part of reality.  (p. 254-308) 
The international system is the product of any of nine possible outcomes from 
these three cultures and three degrees of internalization. The level of cooperation is 
located on a horizontal axis, from Hobbesian to Kantian, and the degree of 
internalization is placed on vertical axes from the bottom up. A state can move 
anywhere along these horizontal and vertical lines depending on where in its history 
and identify formation it is. The advantage of this framework allows us to look at the 
world as changeable. If states engage in new practices it is possible to create different 
identity structures and the realities of states and societies can, thereby, change. (p. 
312-313) 
 
2.4 Hypothesis 
 
In my theoretical foundation I argue that the logic of state action in the NMSs in EU 
derive from a state centric realist tradition enhanced with a constructivist view. This 
framework, I uphold, answers the question of why a NMS accumulate competences in 
the state at the expense of regional actors when the EU delegates power.  
 
Part II – Empirical Framework 
 
In order to apply the theoretical framework in Part I, this section builds an empirical 
base for decentralization and centralization processes. It starts with a description of a 
decentralization trend on the EU level and in the structural funds. Thereafter, there 
will be a brief description of the 2007-2013 structural funds and changes. Finally I 
will discuss the example of the structural funds in Poland and show that there is a 
centralization tendency by the Polish state within these funds.  
 
3 Decentralization in EU Policy Making 
 
This section describes the decentralization trend in cohesion policy on an EU level. 
The first part lays out essential EU documentation of decentralization. The second 
part discusses implications of decentralization in the NMSs. 
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3.1 EU Regional Decentralization Trend 
 
EU regional policy has since 1999 been increasingly decentralized. This originated 
with the Commission’s vision of the future of regional policy. The Commission stated 
in a comparative analysis of old and new policies that it wants “to ensure a clearer 
vision of responsibilities and a stronger application of the principle of subsidiarity: the 
European Commission supervises the compliance with the strategic priorities but the 
management of the programs is more decentralized” (Commission 1999 p. 15; 
Gemitis p. 78) The most important documentations are, though, the White Papers on 
Reforming the Commission I & II and European Governance. (Commission 2000, 
2000a, 2001) The reasons for the policy of reforming the Commission can be traced 
to two developments. The first is the new implementation guidelines for the PHARE 
program issued in 1998. The other is the reform of the structural funds in 1999. (Levy 
2003 p. 88) 
Traditionally, regional EU policies have been characterized by a centralist model. 
However, for the first time, delegation to the member states in terms of administrative 
decentralization was mentioned in the White Paper Reforming the Commission. 
(Levy 2003 p. 88) In this paper the Commission lays down a ‘new public 
management’ (NPM) characterized by managerial and service-delivery 
decentralization. The reason for delegation and externalization “of all or part of its 
tasks or activities” (Commission 2000 p. 6) was the wish to refocus on its main task 
and on policy priorities. In part II, externalization is also defined to include 
decentralization, devolution and outsourcing (Commission 2000a p. 17). Furthermore, 
the White Paper on European Governance is committing to a higher level of 
partnership and dialogue between EU and the member states to ensure efficient 
implementation of the policy. (Commission 2001) Both result in decentralization and 
more influence and independence for the member states.  
The new philosophy of delegation and decentralization of the Commission is 
exemplified in some of the main strategies of the new financial framework for 2007-
2013. Decentralization, simplification and a more ‘bottom-up’ strategies are 
suggested. (Commission 2004 p. 13, 17, 21) Furthermore, in the new cohesion policy, 
regional and local actors are to be more involved in the preparation of programs. 
(Commission 2006) 
 
3.2 Confused Expectations and Decentralization 
 
Decentralization in the quasi federal system of EU has created a dilemma of confused 
expectations in the NMSs. Traditionally, the Commission has followed a Weberian 
and centralist model of public administration with strict bureaucratic rules and 
procedures. However, the NPM reform has meant a new set of ideas and values, more 
suited for business and market mechanisms, than the older version. These new ideas 
include decentralization and change of public services and practices. (Levy 2003 p. 
83-84) This has resulted in that the EU is giving somewhat mixed signals about 
decentralization in the structural funds. Regionalization in the NMSs has not always 
been successful and one of the reasons for this problem could be the contradicting 
messages that the EU is sending. On the one hand the EU system is centralized and 
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formally bureaucratic, and on the other hand it is not imposing a uniform model for 
regional governance due to lack of competence in this area. This is an especially 
difficult issue for countries still in process of large political and economical changes. 
(Commission 1999 p. 17; Levy 2003 p. 89, Gemitis 2003 p. 898) Poland, which is the 
case studied in this work has, however, despite mixed signals from the EU, succeeded 
rather well in decentralizing authority on the national level to include regional and 
local relevant bodies. (Batt 2002 p. 12) 
 
4 EU Cohesion Policy 
 
The goal of the structural funds is both normative and re-distributive. It was adopted 
into the Treaties in order to increase integration and to decrease the economic 
differences between rich and poor areas of the Union. The funds have two priorities, 
on one hand economic convergence, in accordance with the Lisbon Strategy and in 
order for the EMU to work, and on the other hand, social and economic cohesion 
(from the SEA). The main objective of the new policy is to be a force to “re-launch 
the Lisbon strategy by fostering competitiveness, growth and employment all over the 
Union; on the other side it will be a key instrument to accelerate catching up of 
regions and countries in an enlarged Europe.” (Hubner 2006 p. 9)  
There are three main financial instruments for cohesion policy; The European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), The European Social Fund (ESF) and the 
cohesion fund. These funds are used to finance different objectives. The new cohesion 
policy differs substantially from the prior period. For the 2000-2006 budget period 
there were nine objectives and six financial instruments. For the 2007-2013 budget 
these were reduced to three objectives and three financial instruments. First, Objective 
1, convergence6, financed by the ERDF, the ESF, and the cohesion fund7. Second, 
Objective 2, regional competitiveness and employment8, financed on a regional level 
by the ERDF and on a national level (EES9) by the ESF. Third, Objective 3, European 
territorial cooperation10, financed by the ERDF. (Commission website; Commission 
2007) 
These changes are the product of enlargement. With twelve new NMSs the socio-
economic differences between the countries within the Union has doubled. The 2007-
2013 framework has been redesigned in order to address these changes. Some of the 
differences are; a new simplified policy, a shift of emphasis from social and economic 
cohesion toward convergence, more decentralization of responsibilities and stronger 
partnership in the funds and more decision-making power to member states and sub-
national actors. (Howarth 2005 p. 72-73, Commission 2007) There are no specific 
guidelines of how this decentralization should be actualized. The national 
governments produce a plan through the National Strategy Reference Framework, 
subject to the approval of the Commission. In terms of specific decentralizing changes 
one can see that last budget’s Community initiatives are totally gone. 
                                                 
6
 Regions with a per capita GDP less than 75% of EU-25 average. 
7
 Member states with a GNI less than 90% of EU average. 
8
 Designed to help the richer member states deal with economic and social change, globalization and 
the transition to the knowledge society.  
9
 European Employment Strategy - adaptability of the workforce and job creation. 
10
 European Cross-Border co-operation. 
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5 Poland Empirically 
 
In looking at centralization trends and state action in the NMSs, Poland is the natural 
choice. Many of the recent accessions still have unstable economies or political 
turmoil and a study of such countries could give results today that are askew 
tomorrow. Although Poland has some political problems, it is considered an economic 
success story and is one of the most integrated of the NMSs in terms of EU15 
standards. It is, furthermore, a powerful actor in EU negotiations and one of the 
NMSs that has ‘enthusiastically’ embraced the European ideals. Furthermore, in terms 
of regional policy, it has rather successfully regionalized authority according to EU 
guidelines during its transition before EU membership. The latter is essential making 
a significant study of centralization trends as a product of EU decentralization. (Batt 
2002 p. 12; Marek, Baun 2002 p. 896; Brusis 2002 p. 548-549; EBRD 2003; Slay 
2000 p. 50-51)  
Due to the fact that Poland is also a large country in both size and population, 
and has a rather poor population (until the 2007 accessions, Poland had the poorest 
regions in all of EU), it will receive a huge portion of the new budget. It will all and 
all together with its own contributions have an astonishing total of over 110 billion 
euros to spend on development over the next 7 years!  
 
5.1 Poland and Cohesion Policy 
 
Most of the funds that Poland receives come from Objective 1 and some from 
Objective 2. 67,3 billion euros will be pure EU structural funding. Poland also collects 
an additional 13,2 billion euros from the reinvented CAP and the fisheries fund. The 
portion that Poland is given in structural funds represents almost 22% of the entire 
308 billion euros11 EU cohesion budget. In addition to these funds, the final 
beneficiaries and the Polish government will supplement with 18,3 billion euros in the 
co-financing procedure12. The break-down of these funds are as follows in billion 
euros (MRR 2006; Seminar 2007, Howarth 2005 p. 83):  
 
Structural Funds (67,3) 
Cohesion Fund         21,5 
ERDF            34,1 
ESF             9,7 
Reserves            2,0 
Additional Funds (13,9) 
Agricultural Fund Rural Development   13,2 
European Fisheries Fund        0,7 
Poland’s Co Financing (18,3) 
Public Funds         11,9 
Private Contribution          6,4 
Total        110,3 
                                                 
11
 35.7% of the EU’s budget. 
12
 All EU funds have to be co-financed by either the Polish state or the final beneficiaries, depending 
on the project. EU payments are between 60%-85% for each project. (Commission website) 
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Within Poland these funds are distributed through Operational Programmes (OP’s). 
There are two different kinds of OP’s with different levels of authority. On one hand, 
there are sixteen OP’s regionally managed by the leaders, the Marshals. The Marshals 
are the leaders of the self-governing organ of the regional governments, the 
voivodships. On the other hand, there are six uniform OP’s centrally managed and 
governed from the highest level by the MRR. The break down is as follows (MRR 
2006) in billion euros:  
 
2007-2013  
16 Regional OP’s (one for each region) 15,9  
1 OP Infrastructure and Environment  27,8   
1 OP Human Capital        9,7  
1 OP Innovative Economy       8,3  
1 OP Development of Eastern Poland    2,3  
1 OP of European Territorial Co-op    0,7  
1 OP Technical Assistance       0,5  
Reserves          2,0  
Total          67,3  
 
5.2 Centralization in the Structural Funds in Poland 
 
Evidence suggests that there is a centralizing trend within the structural funds in 
Poland. This is the case despite the increasingly decentralized aims of the 
Commission. As in most cases, there is a power conflict between the national and 
regional actors over the distribution of the structural funds. There are, thus, some 
indications that the Polish state is actively changing the system in order to gain more 
control over the funds at the expense of regional actors. This is particularly evident 
within: the ESF and the ERDF within the Regional OP’s, the distribution between 
centrally and regionally managed programs for the new budget framework, and the 
OP for Development of Eastern Poland. 
This section illustrates the centralizing trend within these three areas. Firstly, the 
Polish government used legislative tools in order to gain influence over Regional OP 
decisions. Secondly, in the new budget, the percentage of regionally managed funds 
has decreased while the percentage of centrally managed funds has increased. Thirdly, 
there is a conflict of interest in the distribution of the funds in favor of the current 
government. 
 
5.2.1 Centralizing Decision-Making Power  
 
The sixteen Regional OP’s are managed by the self-governing and regionally elected 
Marshals. The voivodships have ultimate power over these funds and they report 
directly to the Commission. Hence, the program was designed for the Marshals to 
have the final say over the funds in this program. However, it appears as if the 
government has tried to absorb some of this power by revising the Polish Law on the 
Principles of Development Policy Article 28.3. This revised law was adopted by the 
parliament (Sejmen) and approved by the president on December 6 2006. The 
changes resulted in that some of the autonomous power was taken away from the 
Marshals and given to the regional governors, the Voivods (not to be confused with 
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the voivodship). The Voivods are the central government representatives in the 
voivodships. According to this amendment, the Voivods can supervise project 
selection and veto projects at any stage in the process ‘in case of documented 
irregularities’. This veto has to be approved by the prime minister. (Interview with 
MRR 2007; Haglund 2007; Parliament 2007; MRR 2006)  
Supporters of the law argue that it is important with centralized control over how 
the funds are distributed within the regions. This, due to the inefficiency of the system 
evident from 2004-2006 period, in which the absorption level of the EU funds was 
very low. (Kozak 2006 p. 5) However, critics say that the consequences of article 28.3 
are that it, implicitly depending on interpretation, creates a situation in which there is 
a possibility for the government to control the process over these funds. It does give 
the Polish government the right of oversight over the voivodships and delegates the 
regionally elected Marshals permanently under the government representative in the 
region, i.e. the Voivod. There is, hence, the fear that this could result in that political 
issues get transferred from the capital to the regions. (Parliament 2007, Haglund 
2007) In sum, this arrangement centralizes the power in the Regional OP funds.  
However, the law is in contradiction to EU regulations and it will be changed. 
(Interview with MRR 2007; Sturdo, Bundy 2007) The Commission has pointed to the 
regulation of Direct Effect, Article 249 of EC Treaty, which defines ‘the legal 
character of regulations as the sources of Community law’. (Parliament 2007) In 
terms of the Voivod’s veto right, the Commission has regarded it not in compliance 
with the Council General Regulation13 laying down the general provisions on the 
ERDF, ESF and the Cohesion fund. It is in contradiction to the principle of self 
governing and, hence, the right given by the General Regulation to the self governing 
voivodships and the Marshals over the Regional OP’s by. Even though the veto has to 
be approved by the Polish prime minister doesn’t off-set the fact that it violates EU 
legislation. Furthermore, supervision of the Regional OP’s should not be done by the 
Voivod, since the Commission considers the Voivod ‘situated outside the system of 
authorities’ of the General Regulation14. (Parliament 2007; EurLex) 
However, the law has not affected the power of the regions as of yet and so far, 
no projects have been rejected by the Voivod. (Interview with MRR 2007; Sturdo, 
Bundy 2007) However, this law can be viewed as an attempt by the Polish 
government to gain more influence over the EU funds. 
 
5.2.2 Centralizing the Projects 
 
The Polish government was heavily criticized for the centralized and inflexible format 
of the 2004-2006 Regional Ops. For the previous budget there was only one single 
national code for the IROP. (Kozak 2006 p. 7) As a response to this criticism, the 
government did decentralize this part of the budget to 16 different regional programs 
instead of one for the 2007-2013 period. This new situation gives the voivodships 
more flexibility over the funds (Sturdy, Bundy 2007). However, concurrently the 
government changed the structure of the programs so that more of the funds were 
allocated in the centrally managed OPs instead. The break down is as follows in 
billion euros (MRR 2006; PAIZ) 
 
2004-2006  
                                                 
13
 Council Regulation 1083/2006 ‘General Regulation’ - §58, 59(1)(a), 60. 
14
 General Regulation – §61, 62. 
 20
1 Integrated Regional OP      2,87  26% 
1 SOP Competitiveness      1,30  12% 
1 SOP Human Resources      1,27  11% 
1 SOP Rural Development      1,06    9% 
1 SOP Transport        0,63    6% 
1 SOP Fisheries        0,18    2% 
1 OP Technical Assistance      0,02  >1% 
The Cohesion Fund        3,73  33% 
Total        11,37 
 
(See 2007-2013 above.) During the 2004-2006 budget period, 74% of the funds were 
managed by central government agencies and 26% was managed by the local self 
governing bodies. For 2007-2013 (see 5.1) the Regional OP’s accounted for 23% of 
the funds and the centrally managed OP’s for 77%, with the largest OP Infrastructure 
and Environment of 41%. This represents a centralization by 4% and a decrease of 
regionally managed funds by 11,5%. This sounds rather small, but when the numbers 
are in billions of euros, a 4% decrease is in real money two billion euros. This is an 
amount that is allocated from regional to central management in comparison to the 
previous budget year. Simultaneously, the percentage of funds coming from the 
cohesion fund has decreased from 33% to 32%. The funds from the cohesion fund are 
not subject to the partnership principle15 as the ERDF and ESF are. This implies a 1% 
decrease in funds that must be centrally managed. If the increase in centrally managed 
funds was a result of an increase in the percentage of cohesion funds there would not 
be an argument for centralization. However, the cohesion funds decreased and there is 
actually an increase of funds that potentially could have been allocated to the 
Regional OP’s for the 2007-2013 period. The result of this allocation change is that 
the state gets more influence over which projects to finance.  
 
5.2.3 The Distributional Power 
 
Another interesting situation is that the formula, or algorithm16, that the government 
decided to use in the distribution of the funds to the voivodships strengthens the 
leading party. Using the criteria of the algorithm, the voivodships with a high level of 
unemployment and relatively low GDP receive more money. This has led to that the 
five poorest regions in Eastern Poland will receive more funds per capital than the 
more developed ones in the rest of the country. These five regions have also been the 
poorest regions in the entire EU until the 2007 accessions. Lubelskie (32% of EU15), 
Podkaprackie (33%), Warminsko-Mazurskie (34%), Podlaskie (35%) and 
Swietokrzyskie (36%). (Haglund 2007; MRR 2006a p. 22, 106, 141; Kozak 2006 p. 
17) 
These five voivodships got most money both through the Regional OP’s and 
through the OP Eastern Poland. The national government bases this decision on that 
the need for development and integration is greater in the poorer regions than in the 
other. The other voivodships were consequently very disappointed. Lubelskie will 
receive 1,156 billion euros or 530,3 euros per capita, Podkarpackie 1,136 or 541,6 per 
                                                 
15
 Cohesion policy “operates through close cooperation between the Commission, national 
governments and regional authorities”. (Hix 2005 p. 289) 
16
 Algorithm 80+10+10. Size of the population (80%), level of unemployment in the districts (10%) 
and GDP level in the voivodship (10%). 
 21
capita, Warminsko-Mazurskie 1,037 or 725,6 per capita, Podlaskie 0,636 or 530,2 per 
capita and Swietokrzyskie 0,726 or 564,8 per capita. Together they will receive 4,691 
billion euros. In addition they will also get 2,3 billion Euros from the OP 
Development of Eastern Poland, which brings this number up to a total of 6,991 
billion. This results in that 21,5% of the population will receive 38,5% of the funds. 
(MRR 2006; Sturdo, Bundy 2007; interview MRR 2007)  
It is, however, a known fact that there is a problem with fund absorption capacity 
in these regions. There has been little, or no, foreign or domestic investment in these 
regions. The co-financing principle requires part of the investment in project to be 
financed either by the final beneficiary or by the government in order to receive 
money from EU. Therefore, although these regions have the possibility to receive 
huge amounts of funding, they run the risk of not receiving any money at all. (Kozak 
2006 p. 18, Musialkowska, Sapala 2007 p. 1)  
It is interesting in this matter to note that the current government has its main 
electorate in these five regions, and hence have an interest in giving preferential 
treatment to these regions. (Haglund 2007) One can say that, on the one hand, it is 
reasonable that the poorest regions get the most money. However, on the other hand, 
due to the coinciding interests and the disregard for the absorption problem in these 
five regions, one could also argue that the EU funds could have been distributed in a 
different way. The state has tried to deal with the problem of absorption by crating a 
separate body (2005) to manage the funds, the MRR, and hopefully this will be the 
remedy to the problem. (Kozak 2006 p. 5) 
Regardless if there is a political motive of vote appreciation by the government in 
the algorithm formula calculating the fund distribution, or not, the fact is that the 
government is gaining from it. This together with the centralization of the OP’s gives 
the government more control over how and where the money should be spent.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
In looking at the empirical evidence, two things are clear to us. On one hand, the 
Commission’s vision is a stronger application of the subsidiarity principle and 
decision making on the lowest possible level in the structural funds resulting in a 
decentralization process in the structural funds. On the other hand, the Polish state has 
responded to this by activities in drawing competences toward Warsaw instead of 
giving more power to the regions. Hence, a decentralization process on the EU level 
has resulted in a centralization process on a national level. 
  
PART III – Theoretical Application 
 
I have theoretically examined the logic behind state action in the new accessions of 
the Union and empirically shown a tendency of centralization in the member state 
following delegation of power from the EU institutions. This part will use the 
theoretical framework to understand the question of why the Polish is centralizing the 
structural funds. 
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6 Poland Theoretically 
 
In examining state activity in Poland, my research shows centralization developments 
on a national level in the structural funds. This section will investigate this by 
applying the theory-tools developed in part one. First, I will analyze the Polish state 
from the perspective of state centrism and survival strategies. If the state is strong 
domestically, it can remain in power through mobilizing its country’s own resources 
and the taxation of its society. However, if the state is weak, it needs to accumulate 
outside assets. Poland appears to be strong internationally but in some cases weak 
domestically. The Polish state is, therefore, to some extent relying on EU funding to 
compensate for weak internal extraction and mobilization. Secondly, due to the 
historical legacy of centralization, the realist view will be balanced with a 
constructivist perspective. This section starts with a historical account of 
centralization. It is then followed by a discussion about the construct of the state, state 
identity as transformable, and finally the different realities of Poland and the EU. 
 
6.1 State Centrism - Strategies of the Polish State 
 
In order to understand the choices the Polish government is making, it is useful to 
look at recent politics. Strategies of state officials are often dependent on ruling elites. 
Right now there is a leading right wing coalition in power with the main player Law 
and Order (PiS), a moderate right party. PiS is in coalition with Polish Families 
(LPR), a nationalistic and conservative catholic wing and Self-Defence, a 
conservative farmers party. The government is run by the identical twin brothers Lech 
Aleksander Kaczynski and Jaroslaw Kaczynski as president (June 2006) and prime 
minister (October 2005). PiS might not in itself be very nationalistic and protectionist, 
however, it appears more right than it really is because of its coalition partners, which 
both have a small and rather extreme interest group.  
It would have been most natural for PiS to go in alliance with Civic Platform 
(PO) with a more similar right liberal agenda. This coalition would have been strong 
and a reflection of how the Polish people voted. However, this did not happen and PiS 
had to form the alliance with the more conservative parties instead. (Törnquist-Plewa 
2007, Economist 2005) A state centric approach affirms that the main purpose of the 
state is to survive. In order to maintain power, PiS made an ally with unlikely partners 
in preservation purposes and is trying to use EU funding in order to strengthen its 
political standing. 
 
6.1.1 Poland - a ‘Soft Powerful’ State 
 
As we remember from part one, states could be ‘soft’, decentralized and constrained, 
or ‘hard’, centralized and autonomous. Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry have 
developed four hypotheses to test the strength of a state (p. 468-469).  I will use these 
to determine which choices and strategies the Polish state is expected to use in 
retrieving resources.   
Hypothesis one: Soft states will rely on international strategies to a greater extent 
than will hard states. Hard states will rely on domestic strategies to a greater extent 
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than will soft states. In this case Poland is rather soft, since it is to some extent is 
relying on EU funding to build the country.  
Hypothesis two: Internationally weak states will emphasize domestic strategies 
more than will internationally powerful states. Likewise, powerful states will 
emphasize international strategies than will weak states. Poland is a is a significant 
actor internationally and will emphasize international strategies.  
Hypothesis three: Soft states will rely on internal extraction to a greater extent 
than will hard states. Hard states will rely on internal mobilization to a greater extent 
than will soft states. Poland is fairly soft and development of internal mobilization is 
lagging. Direct internal mobilization is growing slowly due to administrational 
problems and indirect internal mobilization has been slugged by over-regulation. 
(Kozak 2006)  
Hypothesis four: Internationally weak states will emphasize external validation 
more than will stronger states. Internationally powerful states will engage in external 
extraction to a larger extent than will weak states. In this case Poland is 
internationally powerful and engages in external extraction in terms of EU funding.   
The conclusion is that Poland is internationally powerful state and relatively soft 
domestically. International strength lies in its sheer size and large population, which 
bears weight in EU decision-making. Poland has often shown itself an important and 
autonomous player on an EU level making sure that its interests are heard, even if it is 
against the opinions of the other member states. However, on a domestic level, Poland 
is a little ‘weaker’. Although it is one of the more stable economies of the Eastern 
accessions and ranks high on the integration scale, domestically it still has had some 
economic and administrational difficulties. (Kozak 2006; EBRD 2003; Slay 2000) As 
the Economist describes Poland “From afar, the Polish eagle is an impressive sight. 
Poland has never been so democratic, so secure and so prosperous. Yet from close up, 
the Polish eagle looks tatty, tired and tied up in red tape.” (Economist 2005)  
As a result, in terms of the structural funds, it is natural for the Polish state, 
which is in the business of survival, to use the strategy of external extraction to 
compensate for a sometimes lacking possibilities of internal mobilization and internal 
extraction. “Our model suggests that soft, powerful states will be compelled, by the 
combined logic of their domestic and international positions, to pursue a dominant 
strategy of external extraction. (Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry 1989 p. 471) Therefore, 
this analysis confirms that it is anticipated that the state will try to control as much of 
the EU funds given to Poland as possible, hence centralize power to the state.  
 
6.1.2 Internal Mobilization and Extraction 
 
Poland might seem strong from the outside, but it is somewhat fragile on the home-
front by an at times weak ability for strategies of internal mobilization and extraction.  
First, direct internal mobilization is not so easy in the privatized and globalized 
economy of the common market. Membership in the Union means the acclimatization 
to competition rules and liberalized economies. It is hard for a state in the Union to 
seize control over the means of production. Even though Poland is persisting its hold 
over the means to expand the state, the EU has in several cases forced Poland to 
privatize and to sell out state owned companies. In terms of the internal market and 
take over bids, the Commission approved a bank merger that the Polish state has 
blocked. The reason is that this merger would mean that the new bank would be larger 
than the state-owned bank PKO BP. (Jones 2007, Commission 2007a) Furthermore, 
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even though the gas markets opened up for competition in 2004, still 95% is 
controlled by national or regional authorities. (Commission 2007b)  
Indirect internal mobilization and attainment of economic goals is frequently 
hampered by the sometimes over-regulated and inflexible legal system facilitating 
economic activities. Furthermore, innovation in Polish enterprises is slow due to 
problems with property rights and difficulties in the creation of public-private 
partnerships. (Musialkowska, Sapala 2007 p. 9, 11, 16; Kozak 2006 p. 4; Economist 
2005; Cellmer & Zrobek 2006 p. 11)  
 Secondly, the possibility for internal extraction in Poland is to some extent 
problematic, due to a tradition of black market jobs, corruption and a complicated tax 
system. First, during communism an illegal black market developed to supplement 
what the communist regime failed to provide. This has created a tradition of the 
Polish people working in the black market. In the mid 1990’s studies showed that as 
much as 30% of the Polish population worked under the table with the result that a 
large portion of tax revenue for the government is lost. (Törnquist-Plewa 2007) 
Second, this double edged heritage of economic back-door entrepreneurship has lead 
to the creation of network building but also to wide spread tendencies of corruption. 
The government has, therefore, justified centralization of the state with that; to fight 
corruption it is easier to have accountability and transparency from a centralized than 
from a local level. However, the backlash of this centralized nature of the Polish state 
is that corruption runs high and deep in the political system. (Kozak 2006 p.4; 
Törnquist-Plewa 2007) Third, currently the tax system in Poland is rather different 
from EU15. It is rather complicated and tax collection is sometimes difficult. There 
are in some cases a lack of clear rules leaving room for interpretation (ex. VAT). 
However, this problem is right now being dealt with and will hopefully not be a 
problem in the future. (Kozak 2006 p. 4; Musialkowska, Sapala 2007 p. 8-9, 15)  
 As a result of sometimes weak internal mobilization and extraction possibilities 
for the Polish state, it places its bets on external extraction instead. Hence, the 
structural fund is important for the survival of the Polish state and state officials try to 
gain as much control over it as possible, resulting in centralization activities. 
Consequently, the state centric realist analysis confirms my hypothesis of 
centralization due to the logic of state action. However, the problem of external 
extraction is that it is a short-term strategy, which erodes the possibility for future 
extractions and often damages relations. It is also often used at the expense of long 
term plans eroding long term economic prosperity. (Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry 
1989 p. 471) This is a problem that Poland might have to face in the future. However, 
all of these situations can, undoubtedly, be solved over time.  
 
6.2 The Application of Constructivism 
 
I have established an attitude of centralization of the Polish government and put this 
into the first layer of theoretical explanations and the context of the realist tradition of 
state centrism. In this section I will discuss the second tier my argument, the attitude 
of the Polish government as a social construct of history. Hence, this part will start 
with evaluating centralization as a tradition of Polish state formation through history 
and the impact it has had on its identity and value configuration. Following will be a 
discussion about centralization as a force of the different realities of EU and Poland. 
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6.2.1 Centralization as a Historical Construct  
 
Poland as we know it has a history of centralization. It is part of the identity of the 
state, the country, and the people. Centralization is a construction of a need to unify 
the three parts of which Poland was created from in 1918, a homogenization of the 
population, the strict state format of the post-war communist era and internal 
insecurity issues.  
Firstly, the “second” state of Poland is not very old. Poland disappeared in 1795 
into Russia, Hapbsburg and Preussen and was then put together again from part these 
of three territorial areas in 1918. However, after more than 100 years of separation, 
these three areas were now very disassociated in terms of political culture and 
administrative traditions. Therefore, integrating these three parts into one unified 
entity was detrimental in order for the infant Poland in order to rebuild as a state, and 
the model used was drawn upon the French and Napolean unitary traditions. 
Centralized governance was, hence, the basis for this new country. (Batt 2002 p. 5; 
Törnquist-Plewa 2007)  
The second predicament was a homogenization of the Polish population. After 
WWII Poland’s borders changed. Russia had taken some of the eastern parts and 
some parts of Germany were given to Poland as compensation for the horrible war 
crimes of Nazi Germany. Hence, in 1945, the Polish border shifted 200 km to the 
west. Before this change, Poland had about 30% of minority populations in the 
country. However, with the new borders these minorities virtually disappeared. The 
Eastern minorities lived mainly in the Eastern parts that now became part of Russia, 
the German minority moved westward and most of the Jewish minority was 
annihilated in the holocaust. The result was that Poland became about 95% ethnically 
Polish. It is less complicated to centralize a country with a comparable population 
since there are fewer conflicting interests, simultaneously as control is easier. This 
situation paved the way for nationalist objectives to take charge.  (Batt 2002 p. 6-7, 
Törnquist-Plewa, 2001 p. 8, 2007) 
After WWII, Poland aligned itself with Russia and became a communist state. 
This resulted in a rigid formal centralization of the state and control of economics. In 
other words, power was all in the central authority and regional identity was 
destructed. Hence, the polish state formation went from centralized to even more 
centralized in its early years. (Batt 2002 p. 2, 8, Törnquist-Plewa 2007) 
A fourth situation of internal insecurity of the country forced the state to keep its 
format centralized in order for the country to stay intact. The two large countries 
bordering Poland, Germany and Russia, have always been its archenemies. Germany 
didn’t accept the Polish border being moved into its territory until 1972. Hence, 
between 1945 and 1972 there was constant tension along the German border. Poland 
was during this period dependent on Russian soldiers guarantee the hold of this 
territory. It was, therefore, important for the Polish government to remain in control 
over this area. Hence, a decentralization of the power to the voivodships would mean 
loosing the iron control over this enclave, and was never considered at all during this 
time. (Batt 2002 p. 7; Törnquist-Plewa 2007) 
 
6.2.2 EU and Poland – Different Realities 
 
Centralization tendencies can, furthermore, be contributed to the turbulent history of 
state building characterized by radical changes and lack of continuity. The 
manifestation of the nation came before the state (as contrary to Western Europe) and 
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once the state emerged, it was under constant threat and in need of protection. From 
this past comes a tradition of centralized governance that is embedded, not only in the 
state itself, but also in the philosophy of the people. This phenomenon has led to a 
mentality of nationalism and centralization. The philosophy in Poland is that; what is 
good for the state is also good for the nation. If the state is equal to nation in the 
nation-state, it is then natural to have a strong central state, since it would mean 
having a strong nation. This same line of argument explains why Poland joined the 
EU despite strong national resistance. This, since it was in the nation’s interest to 
increase its standard and status, to have inner stability within the country and to 
secure the borders toward its archenemies Russia and Germany. Simultaneously, this 
explains why Poland wants to protect its interest and the suspicion of the state toward 
EU. Hence, according to this perspective, the centralization of the structural funds 
would be a natural for the protectionist Polish state and in the interest of the nation. 
(Törnquist-Plewa 2001 p. 15, 18, 2005 p. 45, 2007; Batt 2002 p. 2) 
Considering EU and Poland having different historical backgrounds, we can 
apply the Wendtian power grid to understand their divergent realities. According to 
Wendt, states can move from a Hobbesian to a Lockean to a Kantian culture. They 
can also progress from a first to a second to a third degree of internalization in each of 
these cultures. I argue that Poland is in a Lockean level of cooperation with the 
possibility of proceeding to the Kantian. However, due to historical and political 
circumstances, there are socialization forces keeping the reality of the state of Poland 
within a first or possibly second degree of internalization. The outcome is that Poland 
regards other states as enemies and cooperation is based primarily on material or 
coercive means. EU, on the other hand, is located in a Kantian culture and a third 
degree of internalization, perceiving the world as an arena for friendly cooperation.  
Consequently, Poland and the EU have two very different views of what reality 
entails. However, there is a possibility, devoid of external shocks, for these views to 
merge. Since identities are socially constructed, and EU norms are being transported 
into Polish socialization processes, Poland is slowly reconstructing itself toward an 
EU15 reality. However, in the meantime, Poland will guard its sovereignty, which it 
historically has fought so hard for. It will also engage in centralizing and protectionist 
activities any chance it gets. Therefore, when EU decentralizes its policies, the Polish 
state uses this freedom to try to retrieve as much material resources as possible. 
Hence, it is centralizing the structural funds, in order to survive in the environment of 
its reality. (Wendt 1999, Batt 2002) 
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7 Conclusion  
 
This work examines state action and regional policy in the new accessions of the EU 
by studying Poland. It does this by looking at the puzzle of why decentralization 
processes in the structural funds on an EU level result in centralization activities in the 
member state. My empirical material establishes a pattern of ‘opposite effect’ of EU 
policies in Poland.  
The inspiration for this research is the challenges that the NMSs face in joining 
the Union. Therefore, I have looked at some of the reasons behind this dilemma. I 
argue in this work that a state centric perspective complemented with a constructivist 
approach can explain this puzzle. This hypothesis is confirmed by my analysis of 
Poland. I conclude that the state is the most important actor in the system in Poland 
and its main objective is to survive. It does so by collecting resources. These 
resources could derive from, for example, taxing its own people (internal extraction), 
or from outside resources, such as EU funding (external extraction). However, since 
Poland is domestically weak in terms of possibilities for mobilizing or extracting 
resources, outside means become more important. Hence, when the EU delegates 
power to the state in these structural funds, the Polish state tries to collect as much 
influence over these funds as possible. However, there is a second aspect of the Polish 
centralization attitude that is not adequately explained by a realist perspective. State 
construction through history is also an important factor in understanding the actions of 
the state. Therefore, exploring past experiences and the nature of state formation in 
Poland can complement our understanding of its protectionist and centralizing 
reactions.  
EU and Poland have different realities and logics behind state action. 
Membership in the EU means having to give up some sovereignty and agree to a pre-
packaged deal of rules and norms. However, having clashing perceptions could result 
in conflicting interests in the ideas and implementation of EU policies on a national 
level. Poland is still in the Lockean reality while EU15 is in a Kantian culture. Poland 
is in transition of adjusting to Union values but the deconstruction of ideals and 
identities formed throughout history could take some time. Identities that are changing 
are, on one hand, physical in terms of its economy, industry and infrastructure and,  
on the other hand, psychological in terms of conformity to EU values.  
 This study deals with the reasons of state action and underlying differences in the 
EU institutions and the EU12 and possibly it can serve as a contribution to the broader 
debate in this issue. My analysis shows that policies in this case result in a distancing 
rather than a furthering the integration process. This scenario raises a number of other 
questions for future research. Interesting would be to explore what need to be changed 
in order for EU policies to be implemented properly in the NMSs? Even more 
detrimental is the question of what the implications are on EU legitimacy?  
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